Through US Spectacles
Choosing Between Two Rational Responses to Ukrainian Attacks on Pre-2014 Russian Territory That Are Facilitated by the United States and Europe.
Originally published by The Duran on June 27th, 2026.
For those who have been objectively covering the war in Ukraine, two emerging positions have developed regarding how President Putin should handle attacks on Russia by Ukraine that are facilitated by the Europeans and Americans. While this would seemingly be an issue most commonly considered by the Russian people themselves, it is also something the geopolitical community must analyze, as the lessons and precedents involved are applicable to all nations and the ramifications extend far beyond what is currently happening to Russia.
It is obvious that the United States, EU leadership, and certain NATO countries are pulling the strings in Kiev. Specifically, they are directly enabling Ukrainian attacks on Russia by providing resources, guidance systems, intelligence, and military planning that target pre-2014 Russian territory. Therefore, the United States and these other Western entities bear responsibility, and that is not debatable. The more pressing question is how should Putin and the Russian Federation (or any country facing similar circumstances) respond to such provocations and attacks.
On one side is the current Russian strategy, which recognizes that while the United States and the Europeans are both responsible for these Ukrainian attacks, Russia's approach toward each should be fundamentally different. This is because the Russian leadership believes it is better to weaken, in whatever way possible, the relationships and alliances between Europeans and Americans rather than take actions that would strengthen them or bring them closer together. Given that any improvement in United States and European relations can only work against Russian interests, this position is rational.
The opposing perspective holds that while the Europeans and the United States are different actors, red lines and other unacceptable actions must be confronted decisively so that Russian deterrence remains a respected factor in Western calculations. Although very different than the current approach, this alternative position is also rational. A global military power such as Russia cannot simply allow its cities, infrastructure, and strategic facilities to be targeted by drone swarms without consequence. Doing so could easily exacerbate the problem and encourage similar actions in the future.
This is one of those rare cases where there is validity in both strategic approaches, and it’s difficult to disagree with either position at face value.
That said, when evaluating which of these two approaches is more appropriate for Russia, there is an additional perspective that should be considered. It is a distinctly American way of viewing the situation, and it is important enough to factor into the calculation. It is this perspective that this article will focus on and expand upon.
American View of Russia
When it comes to the United States' position on Russia, everyday Americans, coastal elites, and even much of the government itself do not genuinely dislike the Russian Federation or it’s people. While there is a small yet powerful contingent that would like to see Russia weakened, broken apart, or Putin removed from power, their position primarily exists within the context of Russia being a resource rich country that many in the United States feel entitled, for lack of a better word, to exploit.
Ultimately, if any other nation occupied Russia's position and possessed their immense resources, American elites would take the same stance. For example, a distant but fundamentally similar mentality can be seen in America's growing interest in places such as Greenland and even, to some extent, Canada. Just as with Russia, there are enormous strategic and resource considerations at play and the American instinct is to exploit the situation to whatever level they can get away with. This is simply how the United States operates.
To be clear, I am not equating the attacks and provocations against Russia with America's evolving policies toward Greenland and Canada. They are clearly not the same. My point is simply that all three possess enormous strategic resources that the United States would very much like to steal. Whether you are Russia, Denmark, a NATO ally, or even Canada, America's close friend and neighbor, no country is completely beyond the reach of the strong arm of the American empire.
And while this sort of perspective is unhealthy and quite frankly obscene, it is at the same time very different from actually hating Russia, whether as a country, a society, or as a people.
Relations
As stated above, Americans do not hate Russia. As a result, Russophobia does not exist in the United States to the same degree that it exists in parts of Europe. Broadly speaking, Russia and the United States have had a largely positive relationship for much of American history, despite periods of intense rivalry.
In the late 1700’s, Russia played an important role in helping the young United States preserve its independence during the Revolutionary War era. During the American Civil War, the Russian Empire openly favored the Union and opposed foreign intervention on behalf of the Confederacy. The Soviet Union later partnered with the United States in the defeat of Nazi Germany during World War II, a sacrifice that remains one of the most significant military contributions in history. And following the attacks of September 11, 2001, Russia was also among the first countries to offer intelligence cooperation and assistance to the United States in its fight against terrorism.
While there have certainly been periods of profound disagreement between Washington and Moscow, the history of the relationship shows that Russia is also a country that has, at various critical moments, stood alongside the United States during some of the most consequential periods in American history.
Cold War Sentiments
Something often forgotten is that Americans felt true sympathy for the Russian people and the lack of freedom they endured under the Soviet system. As a child, I vividly remember collect8ing school supplies and items such as blue jeans to send to people in the USSR. This was a common experience as Americans were genuinely empathetic to the plight of ordinary Russians.
When images later emerged of Soviet republics falling away and Russians being able to openly criticize their own government, Americans were jubilant and optimistic. There was widespread relief that Russia was finally on a path toward democracy, a market economy, and a future as a partner rather than an enemy. More importantly, Americans viewed, and many still view, the Russian Federation as a symbolic prize for the victory over the Soviet Union and communism. This sentiment remains an important part of how many Americans subconsciously view Russia. It is also a major reason why efforts to portray the Russian Federation as some sort of uniquely evil monster have never fully resonated with large segments of the population.
Certainly, there are powerful elements within the mainstream media, intelligence community, and military industrial complex that promote a hostile view of Russia. However, that narrative struggles because it runs contrary to the longstanding belief that Russia itself represents a successful outcome of the Cold War. In the eyes of most Americans, the Russian Federation was never supposed to be an adversary. It was supposed to become part of a more stable and peaceful world that emerged after the collapse of communism.
Furthermore, there is also the implicit understanding among policymakers, military professionals, and everyday citizens that the Russian Federation inherited an enormous amount of Soviet military technology, expertise, and strategic capability. Those capabilities remain highly dangerous, widely acknowledged, and cannot be challenged directly without incurring enormous risks. Regardless of political disagreements, Russia is still recognized as a major nuclear power whose capabilities must be taken seriously.
Although prominent voices such as Senator Lindsey Graham continue to promote aggressively anti Russian positions, that viewpoint is far from dominant among the American public and is not nearly as universal within government circles as many outsiders assume. Even so, it often receives disproportionate attention despite representing a relatively narrow segment of opinion. Even the late Senator John McCain’s characterization of Russia as a gas station masquerading as a country was met with skepticism rather than agreement. Most Americans viewed such comments as evidence of an aging neoconservative warmonger who was struggling to adapt to the realities of the post Cold War era.
The bottom line is Americans did not endure decades of Cold War tensions, celebrate the peaceful collapse of the Soviet Union, and welcome the possibility of a new relationship with the Russian Federation so that peace could later be discarded to line the pockets of wealthy elites. The Cold War was won to avoid a catastrophic conflict between great powers, not to create the conditions for one. That is why Americans instinctively recoil at policies that appear to move the United States and Russia closer toward direct military conflict. Whether they support Russia or not is beside the point. Their view is that the entire purpose of the post Cold War era was to prevent a direct kinetic engagement with Russia.
China Is Seen Differently
The significance of this perspective becomes easier to understand when viewed through the broader lens of how Americans perceive China. Even among Americans who are skeptical of interventionism and foreign wars, the relationship with China is viewed through a very different prism than the US relationship with Russia.
Unlike Russia, Americans tend to view China differently for two primary reasons. First, China remains governed by a communist political system. Second, it is widely perceived as America's principal emerging competitor on the world stage.
What makes this dynamic particularly interesting is that Americans generally do not dislike the Chinese people themselves. On the contrary, Americans have long appreciated Chinese food, art, culture, and the many contributions Chinese Americans have made to the country. The issue, from the American perspective, is not the people. It is the Chinese state and the strategic challenge it presents.
And because of that, you can find American parents who would willingly send their children to fight and die in a war against China. Likewise, you can also find young men and women who would volunteer to go fight and die there themselves. Given the opportunity, Americans would jump headfirst into a conflict with China and consider it justified.
What makes this particularly relevant is that these same sentiments do not exist when it comes to Russia. No matter what the media reports, and no matter what you might read or hear from neocon politicians and MIC shills, America does not have an issue with the Russian Federation or it’s people. Unlike China, you will NEVER find parents eager to send their children to fight and die against Russia, nor will you find young people enthusiastic about going to war with Russia themselves. They simply do not exist.
Distinct Perspective in Europe
While the United States and Russia have experienced a largely productive relationship dating back to the late 1700s, that same period can be characterized by the emergence and proliferation of Russophobia throughout Europe.
Beginning during the reign of Napoleon and continuing through the nineteenth century and on to the present day, Russia increasingly became the subject of a sustained political and media campaign portraying it as an aggressive, autocratic, expansionist, and backward power. The United Kingdom was particularly influential in penning and promoting these narratives, which were also echoed and reinforced by other European powers, including France. What is remarkable is how many of the accusations and talking points used against Russia today can be traced directly back to arguments first popularized more than two centuries ago.
This historical perspective helps explain why current European leadership, particularly in countries such as the United Kingdom, France, and Germany, are far more hostile toward Russia than their American counterparts. Even when such policies impose significant economic costs on their own populations, there remains a strong and often irrational inclination among European leaders to oppose or even fight Russia. In this respect, Russophobia in Europe remains an important factor responsible for contemporary policy toward Russia.
The European attitude toward Russia is therefore distinct from the American one. While the United States often approaches Russia through the lens of exploitation or geopolitical opportunity, Europeans approach Russia through a much older framework rooted in historical suspicion and unwavering disdain.
Naivety Disclaimer
Before I conclude, it is necessary to offer a disclaimer against any accusation of naivety regarding my view and position on how America perceives and operates in relation to Russia.
Specifically, I fully understand that the will of the American people is mostly irrelevant to those in power. I am in no way suggesting that because the electorate maintain a favorable view of Russia, it alone will prevent future war.
On a personal level however, I have been fortunate to have considerable access to numerous individuals in the United States government, as well as influential circles in the financial world. This experience provides me with a robust, ongoing understanding of how power operates, where exploitation occurs, and where the unwritten boundaries exist.
That said, I am also keenly aware that many figures within the establishment, the permanent bureaucracy, and the political class engage in considerable theatrics when discussing foreign policy and national security, especially in regard to Russia. Whether for political advantage, institutional interests, public consumption, or financial gain, there is a clear push towards a kinetic engagement with Russia. Despite such reckless behavior, there is a significant difference between the rhetoric presented publicly and the realities understood behind closed doors.
It should be further noted that, while there are certainly European leaders who do not wish to do Russia harm, there concurrently exists an extraordinarily powerful faction within the European establishment that is fervently committed to confrontation with Russia.
At first glance, these individuals may appear similar to their American counterparts. Both advocate hardline policies, both support increased pressure on Russia, and both regularly employ aggressive rhetoric. However, the truth is that these two groups are not the same.
It is therefore critically important to recognize the differences between the public US neocon narrative surrounding Russia and the realities understood by the same individuals operating behind closed doors. While there may be an appetite within certain circles to exploit or extract concessions from Moscow, there is also an understanding that such efforts can only go so far when it comes to Russia.
My point is not that America is incapable of acting aggressively, opportunistically, or in a manner that could lead to war. Quite the opposite. The American empire operates from an exploitative mindset, and that reality is certainly in play with the conflict in Ukraine. The United States routinely seeks domination when opportunities present themselves and is willing to provide funding, weapons, intelligence, and support when doing so advances its interests.
Yet exploiting a geopolitical situation for profit is not the same thing as viewing a nation as a permanent enemy whose destruction is the ultimate objective. Russia occupies a unique place within the American psychological, political, and financial landscape. It is not viewed in quite the same way as America’s traditional adversaries.
For all the rhetoric and escalation, there remains a clear reluctance within Washington to engage in a direct military confrontation with Russia. There is a reason the conflict continues to be fought through intermediaries rather than by American forces themselves. Understanding that reality is essential to understanding why there are limits, both spoken and unspoken, to how far many influential Americans are ultimately willing to push escalation and conflict with Moscow.
Conclusion
As it currently stands on the battlefield, the Russian military continues to advance in a systematic, methodical, and successful manner. If current trends continue, Russia will consolidate control over the Donbas, thereby opening much of eastern Ukraine to further Russian military and political influence. There is little indication that Ukraine, Europe, or even the United States possesses an easy military solution capable of fundamentally reversing that trajectory.
That said, the one development that could derail Russia's strategy and jeopardize everything it has achieved thus far would be a direct confrontation with NATO brought about by an Article 5 scenario. Since the beginning of the special military operation, Ukraine and certain European elements have repeatedly attempted to draw the United States more directly into the conflict. They understand that an unprovoked attack on NATO territory would dramatically increase the likelihood of direct American involvement. And they are correct in that assessment.
The United States takes its Article 5 obligations seriously, particularly when it involves longstanding treaty allies and countries such as Poland. If Washington were to conclude that a qualifying Article 5 event had occurred, the United States would almost certainly put boots on the ground. Crossing that threshold would fundamentally alter the nature of the conflict. For that reason alone, President Putin must proceed with extreme caution. Whatever military advantages Russia may possess on the battlefield could quickly become secondary if the conflict expands into a direct confrontation with the United States.
In terms of missile and drone attacks on the Russian heartland facilitated by the Europeans and the Americans, it is in Russia's best interest to exercise maximum restraint.
As far as the drone attacks are concerned, Russia's layered air defense network has proven highly capable of dealing with them. Many of these attacks appear designed as much for political messaging, media attention, and psychological effect as they arem for producing meaningful military results. While they certainly generate headlines, their actual strategic impact is limited.
Should long range missiles be launched deeper into pre-2014 Russian territory, that would undoubtedly represent a legitimate crossing of a red line. Even so, Russia possesses sophisticated air defense systems specifically designed to intercept these threats. Missiles do not arrive in unlimited numbers, they are comparatively easier to identify, and they remain well within Russia’s defensive capabilities.
For that reason, Russia need not become overly focused on enforcing red lines. The reality is that the collective West has repeatedly demonstrated a willingness to ignore them. If Russian red lines truly carried decisive weight in Western political calculations, there would never have been the push to admit Ukraine into NATO and the Special Military Operation never would have needed to occur.
There is, however, one red line that unquestionably matters, and that is Article 5 of the NATO Treaty.
This being the hard reality we are dealing with, President Putin should continue the strategy that has thus far produced battlefield success. He should exercise maximum restraint in responding to attacks on the Russian heartland, deny those seeking a wider war the escalation they appear to be looking for, and do everything possible to avoid creating circumstances that could trigger an Article 5 response.
This also reinforces the central argument of the article. Russia cannot afford to treat Europe and the United States as though they are motivated by identical objectives. While both have facilitated attacks against Russia through their support of Ukraine, their motivations and long term goals are not the same.
Europe, particularly its most hardline political elements, represents Russia's more enduring strategic challenge. The United States, despite its provocations, its pursuit of strategic advantage, and the many grievances Moscow may legitimately hold against it, also shares more than 250 years of diplomatic history with Russia. That history has included periods of cooperation, partnership, and even the successful management of the Cold War without a direct military confrontation between the two countries.
If that history demonstrates anything, it is that profound disagreements between Moscow and Washington can be managed without allowing them to become an irreversible catastrophe. This reaffirms the fact that Russia should continue to distinguish between the United States and Europe when determining how it responds to future provocations.
Ultimately, President Putin must maintain different relationships with the Europeans and the Americans because they are not the same. The Europeans, particularly the most hardline factions within the political establishment, appear willing to sustain confrontation with Russia indefinitely and in some cases seem to view Russia itself as a problem that must be permanently solved. The Americans, while often arrogant, opportunistic, and willing to stir the pot for strategic advantage, generally understand the limits behind the scenes and the dangers associated with direct conflict between major powers.
Accordingly, Russia's most responsible course of action is to remain disciplined, continue its current military strategy, avoid any action that could credibly trigger Article 5, and recognize that while the Europeans and Americans may often act together, they remain two very different animals whose motivations, objectives, and long term calculations are not the same. Well, at least that’s how it appears Through US Spectacles.
As always, I thank you for your continued support and readership.
Until next time,
Jon Kurpis
P.S. For more of my geopolitical content and analysis, please subscribe to kurpis.substack.com.
DISCLAIMER:
This article is published strictly in my personal capacity and reflects only my individual views and analysis. Nothing herein should be interpreted as an official statement, communication, or policy position associated with my role as an elected official, any municipality, governmental authority, political party, or affiliated public institution. Furthermore, the perspectives expressed do not necessarily reflect the views or positions of The Duran.