PART 3 | Start of a Special Military Operation | Putin’s Russia in Perspective
Russia’s Special Military Operation in Ukraine from its February 24th start through the end of Summer 2022.
Before we proceed with the 3rd installment of Putin’s Russia in Perspective, it is important to remember why this multi-article series was written. The reason for its existence is to disseminate accurate information pertaining to the most important geopolitical conflict of this century; America's dangerous proxy-war with Russia in Ukraine. A war that already qualifies as Europe’s largest armed conflict since World War II.
In the first two segments we studied Vladimir Putin, the Russian nation after the Cold War, and the specific events that occurred over the past thirty years that brought us into the current war in Ukraine. The time has now come to investigate the actual War in Ukraine itself.
Part 3 will chronicle the Russian Special Military Operation in Ukraine from its start on February 24th through the end of Summer 2022. Key assumptions, military strategies and moments in the conflict will be analyzed from multiple perspectives with special emphasis being placed on instances that may have inadvertently or intentionally prolonged the war.
The Special Military Operation Begins:
Russia’s invasion into Eastern Ukraine officially commenced on February 24th, 2022, but signs that conflict was imminent began at least 20 days earlier. On February 4th, Vladimir Putin flew to China to “celebrate” the opening ceremony for the 2022 Beijing Olympics. However, Putin had more on his mind than simply cheering on a sporting event. While in China, Putin and Xi Jinping met formally to discuss NATO’s expansion, sign a trade deal, and to strengthen already blossoming Sino-Russian relations. After their summit, the two leaders issued a press release stating that they:
“oppose further enlargement of NATO and call on the North Atlantic Alliance to abandon its ideologized cold war approaches,…”
The timing of Putin and Xi Jinping’s summit was concerning to geopolitical experts. Specifically, President Putin had a history of military engagement during or after the Olympic games. For instance, Russia’s 2008 war in Georgia took place during the summer Olympics in Beijing. And Russia’s 2014 mission in Crimea was launched immediately after the Winter Olympics in Sochi.
Given that Ukrainian aggression in the Donbas had raged for nearly a decade and all diplomatic resources had been exhausted, it wasn’t a stretch to think that Putin could make a military move after the 2022 Olympics given Russia’s recent military history in relation to the games.
This is precisely what would happen.
On February 21st, one day after the closing ceremony of the Beijing Olympics, Russia formally recognized the sovereignty of the two independent Republics in the Donbas (the DPR & LPR) and agreed to deploy troops to assist them in protecting their territorial integrity.
Then on February 24th, 2022, Russia crossed into Ukraine using a mechanism known as a Special Military Operation (SMO) to assist the Donbas militias and protect their joint security interests.
In the first article of this series, we learned that Vladimir Putin is an educated lawyer who also holds a PhD in Economics and is strong in terms of strategic diplomacy. If there was was one thing Putin could be questioned over, it would be his lack of direct military experience prior to assuming the Presidency. As you will see, Putin’s invasion into Ukraine is done in a manner that is remarkably consistent with his known background and therefore goes to show why it was so important that we learn about it.
When President Putin flew to China a few weeks before invading Ukraine, he accomplished multiple salient diplomatic and economic initiatives. In terms of diplomacy, President Putin cleverly persuaded China to come out publicly against NATO expansion. As far as economics, Putin also signed a massive LNG trade deal with China signaling to the world that future sanctions would not easily topple the Russian economy
Putin’s summit with Xi Jinping was of overall significance because it started the ball rolling in terms of how the international community would come to view the eventual invasion.
And despite narratives to the contrary, the path that Vladimir Putin chose to invade Ukraine exemplified his astute legal mindset as well.
Putin directed Russia to recognize the sovereignty of the DPR and LPR Republics. They, in turn requested that the Russian military help them to protect their territorial integrity. After that occurred, President Putin formally categorized the invasion as a Special Military Operation (SMO) instead of as a war. Embarking on a military operation within this deliberate legal framework signaled to the international community that the SMO was measured and necessary.
At the time of the invasion, the majority of nations were well aware that fighting had gone on continuously since 2014 and world leaders did not like that over 14,000 people in the Donbas had been killed by Ukraine Military attacks.
It was also generally accepted that the DPR & LPR were essentially independent Republics. And Ukraine, in accordance with the Minsk Agreements that they agreed to and signed, was required to change its constitution to recognize the new DPR and LPR status but now refused to do so.
Many nations also believed that NATO expansion was in fact an unecessary provocation and a threat to Russia’s security interests.
While no leader or nation was ecstatic that the Russian military would be fighting along with the Donbas militia against Ukraine, the fact that Russia recognized the DPR & LPR sovereignty, was invited to assist them, and was doing so through a SMO and not through a declaration of war, gave Russia's position objective legitimacy.
Although this legal maneuvering may not have held up on all technical accounts, Putin’s overall legal strategy was successful as the countries representing the majority of the world’s population and largest nuclear arsenals interpreted the Special Military Operation into Ukraine as more of an “intervention by invitation” with both a humanitarian and self-defense component rather than the “war of aggression” that the Collective West wants it to be viewed as.
But as successful as his strategic diplomatic, economic and legal components of the invasion plan had been, President Putin’s assumptions about how the West would perceive the invasion from a strictly military perspective was a catastrophic mistake.
When the SMO was being devised, Russian military strategists told President Putin that they wanted to start the conflict with a massive shock and awe campaign much like the US had done at the start of the 2nd gulf war. They proposed invading Ukraine with approximately 200,000 Russian troops who would quickly lay waste to everything and anyone who stood in Russia’s way. Russian and Ukranian casualties would initially be high and civilians would die in the crossfire, but peace would come quickly once Kiev was captured and Zelensky was detained and re-educated.
Being a risk averse, non-military leader, Putin opted not to take their advice and instead chose to invade Ukraine with a relatively small force of 90,000 soldiers. Moreover, Putin directed his officers to order these soldiers to avoid collateral damage at all costs. Putin believed a smaller operation would be less risky and still be enough of a show of force to demonstrate to the Kiev regime and to the Collective West that Russia was serious and would not end the SMO until its objectives were met. These objectives included:
• No NATO in Ukraine Policy
• Peaceful independence for DPR & LPR
• Acknowledgement that Crimea is Russian.
• Removal of NAZI elements from the military
President Putin believed that Russia’s objectives were more than reasonable and expected to negotiate a quick end to the SMO.
In March 2022, the Russians and Ukrainians engaged in considerable dialog in Ankara, Turkey. According to officials from both Belarus and Israel who took part in the negotiations, Ukraine and Russia hammered out a peace agreement that both Zelensky and Putin agreed to. Although a copy of this agreement has not been made public, what we do know is that Zelensky was willing to meet Russia's four objectives and Ukraine would in turn receive robust security guarantees and economic aid. Unfortunately, the Biden administration caught wind of the peace settlement and immediately sent Boris Johnson to Ukraine to pressure Zelensky into backing out of the deal before it could be announced.
Incorrect Assumptions Abound
President Putin’s assumption that the West would respect his small invasion force was completely wrong. In fact, President Biden and U.S. intelligence agencies interpreted it as a sign of Russian military weakness. The U.S. assumed that Putin would only invade with the biggest force possible. When a mere 90,000 troops crossed the border and then didn’t engage in order to avoid civilian casualties, the Pentagon took this as a reliable indication that Russia could only afford a small rag-tag military that was likely on the brink of collapse. So, instead of allowing Zelensky to settle with Russia in March 2022, the U.S. and the UK pressured him to back out of the deal as they believed Ukraine could drive Russian forces out with their assistance.
The Collective West promised Zelensky that they would finance and equip the Ukrainian military for however long it would take to beat Russia. They also promised him future membership to NATO and the European Union. To expedite Putin’s demise, the U.S. and EU would also continue to levy massive economic sanctions on Russia. The Collective West also assumed that the economic sanctions would be too much for the Russian economy to sustain and the people would ultimately rise up against Putin and form a new, pro-West Russian government.
Lastly, Zelensky assumed that the Collective West couldn’t possibly be wrong with their assessment so he agreed to go along with their plan to back out of the peace deal and instead continue fighting a war against Russia.
As you can see and will continue to see, incorrect assumptions by Russia, Ukraine and America result in catastrophic outcomes.
The failure to get a peace deal completed at the end of March 2022 was a shock to President Putin. But never someone who was easily deterred, Putin stuck with his limited forces strategy and tried multiple times to end the fighting with detente and negotiations. From April through the Summer of 2022, an unbelievably brave Ukrainian military fought with all the bravado of a much larger military. And with equipment and aid pouring in from America and European allies, Zelensky was able to motivate his troops to fight for total victory over the Russian forces.
Summer 2022
By the Summer of 2022, President Putin realized his assumptions about utilizing a small military force were incorrect. To resolve this mistake, Putin met with his top military officers and asked for their honest opinions. They directly told Putin that:
• The Russian military wanted to go hard, but you (Putin) insisted we go soft.
• The Russian military requested more troops, but you (Putin) denied our request.
• Now because of this mistake, Russia is involved in a military conflict that they can’t win decisively unless they immediately build out a larger force with the right capabilities.
Putting aside his ego and previous assumptions, President Putin listened to his top military officers and allowed them to change the overall strategy to an economy of force mission.
This was a massive mid-war change of strategy and would entail:
• Pulling Russian forces out of areas that held little military value.
• Mobilizing military production so that Russia would never run out of missiles or ammunition.
• Training hundreds of thousands of new soldiers.
• Making Eastern Ukraine into an impenetrable fortress.
• Allowing Ukraine to expend lives and resources trying breach it.
• Only going back on the offensive after Ukrainian forces were sufficiently weakened.
When future historians write the definitive history of the War in Ukraine, they will point to President Putin’s Summer 2022 meetings with his top military officers and the subsequent change of strategy as the turning point that would ultimately determine the winner of the conflict.
Economic Sanctions on Russia
As mentioned earlier, a major component of the Collective West’s strategy to topple Putin and win the War in Ukraine was to impose unprecedented economic sanctions on Russia. According to the US Treasury Department
“On a daily basis, Russian financial institutions conduct about $46 billion worth of foreign exchange transactions globally, 80 percent of which are in U.S. dollars…The vast majority of those transactions will now be disrupted."
Even though the United States followed through on those threats, the Russian economy persevered and is actually on pace for growth in 2023. Incredibly, some experts have even gone so far as to say that Russia is better off in the long-term because of these sanctions.
To understand why the U.S. sanctions on Russia failed, we must first understand the basics of unilateral sanctions in general.
America utilizes unilateral sanctions because they are cheap and easy. Sanctions require no upfront money, no public debate and do not require Congressional approval. The President literally decides to sanction a foreign nation, signs some papers and it’s done. Although some economic damage is inflicted through the sanctions, there are virtually no examples of it working in terms of it causing a desired regime change.
The core problem with unilateral sanctions is that most countries in the world do not agree with the practice. There are many legitimate reasons for this position. Unilateral sanctions are arbitrary, unequally applied, target innocent individuals, are very prone to abuse and do not result in the desired regime change outcome. Furthermore, there is no universally agreed upon law or governing body that approves them. And most of all, unilateral sanctions are a stark reminder to all nations who trade with the dollar that America can and will cut them off from the global economy if it suits their interests.
It is also important to remember that unilateral sanctions are NOT the same as UN sanctions. UN sanctions via a fifteen member UN Security Council has at the very least some legitimacy behind it. Fifteen countries debate the infraction and vote to see if sanctions are appropriate. Moreover, UN sanctions have teeth in that 193 UN member nations are legally obligated to enforce them.
So why didn’t the sanctions work?
As has often been the case during this conflict, the reason for failure is the direct result of faulty assumptions on the part of one or more of the nation’s involved. This was again the case with the US sanctions strategy.
America incorrectly assumed three things to be true.
The underlying Russian economy was weak and on the verge of collapse.
President Putin was not equipped as a leader to handle aggressive sanctions.
The world would universally rally around Ukraine and enforce the unilateral U.S. sanctions placed on Russia.
Considering that the success of the U.S. sanctions on Russia were reliant on these three assumptions being accurate, it’s inexplicable how the United States got this so wrong, especially given what we know.
For starters, the underlying Russian economy isn’t weak. Russia has a low debt to GDP ratio, an educated workforce that is particularly strong in math, science and technology, robust manufacturing and production capabilities, strong consumer demand, and an abundance of the world's most sought-after and valuable natural resources. Moreover, President Putin isn’t a run-of-the-mill, figurehead leader. Putin has a PhD in Economics with a specialty in exploiting the mineral economy as well as a track record of handling financial crises. Lastly, Russia isn’t solely responsible for the crisis in Ukraine. Objectively speaking, America and NATO both instigated the conflict and Ukraine itself also bears much of the blame.
Based on all of these factors, many nations across the world were uncomfortable supporting unilateral sanctions against Russia.
In the end, the unilateral sanctions that were intended to cut Russia off from doing business with America, the EU and the rest of the world did not work as the West had intended. Russia successfully countered them by simply expanding trade with China, Brazil, India, Malaysia, Indonesia, Turkey, Iran, Saudi Arabia, etc. And once Russia demonstrated that it was possible to remain economically stable outside American and European financial systems and markets, more and more countries sided with them and now see this as an opportunity to begin breaking away from U.S. financial control. If anything, U.S. sanctions inadvertently made Russia stronger and motivated many nations to move away from trading with the dollar.
By the end of the summer of 2022, Russia and Ukraine/Collective West were of two completely different mindsets.
Russia was undergoing a massive change of strategy and taking the required steps to shift the SMO to an economy of forces mission. Russian soldiers were being called in from positions not deemed essential and the Eastern line was being heavily fortified. Russia was correcting errors, ramping up production, and readying themselves to win a long war of attrition.
At the same time Russia was admitting their mistakes and adjusting their forces accordingly, the Collective West was cocky and doubling down on all they professed to be true even when the facts painted a much different picture.
The Biden Administration believed that U.S. sanctions combined with NATO guidance and weaponry would give Zelensky all that was required to not just force Russia out of Ukraine, but also enough to topple the Russian government. All that was left for Ukraine to do was to wait for the opportunity to launch a massive counter-offensive against Russia. On August 29th, that opportunity arrived and Ukraine launched the first of what would be two concurrent counter-offensives. It is at the start of these counter-offensives in late August / early September 2022 that we will pick up in the next installment.
This concludes Part 3 of this multi-article series on the Russian-Ukraine War. As always, I appreciate your readership and thank you for your ongoing support and encouragement.
Contact Jon Kurpis:
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